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SUMMARY 
According to the OECD, 4% to 10% of the global corporate income tax revenue, i.e. USD 100 to 240 billion annually, is lost 
due to corporate income tax avoidance (OECD, 2015). Although the existence of the issue is well-accepted by the tax policy 
makers of the developed world, it is extremely difficult to agree on an international tax policy standard which could reduce 
the vulnerability of the sovereign tax regimes. In this article, we summarize the historical background of corporate income 
tax avoidance, and provide evidence of its existence in the EU member states. In addition, we also examine a new 
international income tax model proposed by the European Commission and analyse the expected effects of the proposal 
onthe risk associated with tax avoidance in Europe.    
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INTRODUCTION 
The development of the international business 
environment and the establishment of the modern form of 
multinational enterprise significantly reshaped the tax 
policy structures of countries in the 20th century, resulting 
in new issues which are stillnot solved as of today.  
According to the research in the history of 
economics, the influential European powers were 
exporting capital to their colonies overseas as early as the 
16th and 17th centuries. The investors located in the home 
country were capitalizing corporations and purchasing 
tangible and intangible assets in the colonies. Based on 
the international investor schemes of the 18th and 19th 
centuries, the European entrepreneurs were heading to 
Latin America, Asia or Africa to set up corporations by 
themselves. In these cases, the foreign capital was 
flowing to the host countries in such a way that no 
corporate and strategic dependencies to the home country 
existed; essentially, no structure of parent companies and 
subsidiaries was set up with certain exceptions (Vernon, 
1972; Vernon, 2001). However, the technological 
developments of the 20th century significantly reshaped 
the weak relationship between the countries exporting 
and importing the capital. As the obstacles of the 
immense geographic distances diminished, the investors 
were able to direct and control their investments also 
from the home country. The time and the cost needed 
forpersonal communication with the foreign enterprises 
decreased significantly; therefore, intra-company 
strategic cooperation and control could emerge (Vernon, 
1968), resulting in the development of intra-company 
transactions. Due to the above, currently 70 percent of 
world trade is derivedfrom intra-company transactions of 
multinational corporations(OECD, 2013). 
CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE 
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL TAX 
REGIME 
Not with standing the above, the current 
international tax policy principles are not aligned to the 
changing business circumstances and as a result, are not 
able to provide a stable economic environment to 
corporations and nation states. The current regulatory 
framework of international taxation allocates the income 
of the corporation to those countries where the 
corporation operates a fixed place of business (this is the 
so-called separate entity view) (Musgrave, 1972). 
However, the income allocated to suchplaces may include 
artificial revenues and expenses due to transfer prices of 
the intra-company transactions thatintentionally or 
unintentionally differ from the fair market values.  
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In 1933 the League of Nations proposed the 
introduction of the arm‟s length principle to handle the 
problem of transfer prices (Carroll, 1933). The definition 
of the arm‟s length price was not modified substantially 
in later decades. The work of the League of Nations was 
later overtaken by the OEEC and the OECD, which have 
also agreed on the application of the international tax 
model based on the arm‟s length principle. According to 
the current interpretation of the OECD, the arm‟s length 
price is the price which would be charged between 
independent enterprises in comparable transactions and 
circumstances (OECD, 2012, Article 9.1). Regardless 
ofthe income determined by national accounting 
principles, under the arm‟s length principle the intra-
company transactions shall be viewed as transactions 
made between independent entities and if there is any 
price difference (and as such, profit difference) between 
the two, the income determined based on the arm‟s length 
price shall provide the income tax base. 
Although the arm‟s length principle aims for a 
competitive neutrality among corporate groups and single 
enterprises (OECD, 2010, Article 1.7), it is not suitable to 
control the tax avoidance behaviour of multinational 
corporations. Earlier empirical research published in this 
topic provedthe existence of tax avoidance applying 
different methodologies. One group of studiesanalysed 
the correlation between the rate of tax burden and the 
volume ofincome allocated, comparing the corporate 
income tax rate to the accounting profit of the 
subsidiaries allocated to a given country. For example, 
Hines & Rice (1994) proved that any 1 percent increase 
of the corporate income tax rate results in a decrease of 
2.3 percent of the corporation‟s profit before tax allocated 
to a given country. Grubert & Mutti (1991), Huizinga & 
Laeven (2008) had similar findings. Furthermore, based 
on European data, Bartelsman & Beetsma (2003) proved 
that with the increase of corporate income tax rates, the 
income tax revenue of the countries didnot increase 
simultaneously, because the volume of the income 
allocated to those countries decreased. Grubert (2003) 
applied another type of indirect method to analyse 
American multinational corporations; he found that in the 
case of corporate groups thatare present in high and low 
tax countries at the same time, intra-company 
transactions are more frequent. In addition, regarding the 
United States, Clausing (2006) proved that any 1 percent 
decrease of the corporate income tax rate of a foreign 
country resulted in a 1.9 percent increase inthe volume of 
intra-company transactions heading to that foreign 
country. Clausing (2006) and Avi-Yonah (2009) proved 
the existence oftax avoidance when analysing 
multinational corporations headquartered in the United 
States and found that the volume of the foreign sourced 
profit and the number of employees working in the same 
foreign country weresignificantly different.  
METHODOLOGY AND DATASET 
The empirical data related to the income taxation of 
multinational corporations are usually included in the tax 
returns and qualify asundisclosed information; in most 
developed countries tax legislation prohibits their 
publication. Therefore, similar to previous empirical 
studiesconducted in this topic, we could rely only on the 
published accounting information for the analysis. (The 
Hungarian accounting regulation provides for the 
publication of the income tax base in the explanatory 
notes; however, when analysing international issues, the 
information regarding a Hungarian member of a 
multinational corporation cannot be interpreted in itself.) 
Regarding the research methodology, we relied on 
the practice followed by previous empirical studies 
prepared in the United States and in Europe. We 
reviewed the work of Sheffrin & Fulcher (1984), 
Shackelford & Slemrod (1998), Clausing & Lahav (2011) 
as far as the American economy is concerned. Within a 
European context, we analysed the methodology applied 
by Fuest et al. (2006), Devereux & Loretz (2008), Cline 
et al. (2011) and Oestreicher & Koch (2011).  
Shackelford & Slemrod (1998) and later Devereux 
& Loretz (2008) estimated the income tax base by 
grossing up the income tax liability published in the 
financial statements. Under this step, they were dividing 
the tax liability by the nominal income tax rate (published 
in the tax legislation). In contrast to this methodology, 
Sheffrin & Fulcher (1984), Fuest et al. (2006) and 
Oestreicher &Koch (2011) defined the tax base as the 
book value of the profit or in certain cases, as the 
adjusted book value of the profit.  
In our point of view, the methodology applied by 
Shackelford & Slemrod (1998), and later Devereux & 
Loretz (2008) would be appropriate to estimate the 
income tax base needed for the analysis. However, we 
disagree with the application of the nominal income tax 
rate and opt for the application of the effective income 
tax rates published by the Oxford University Centre for 
Business Taxation. Therefore, we determine the income 
tax base as follows:  
πi
ALS =
 
 
 
 
 
TAX i
ALS
Ti
  if TAXi ≥ 0
TAX i
ALS
Ti
  if TAXi < 0
PBTi      if TAXi = n. a.
 (1) 
Equation 1. Estimate of the income tax base 
where TAX represents the income tax liability published 
in the accounting statement, T represents the effective 
income tax rate of the member state, ALS represents the 
current regulatory framework based on the notion of 
Arm‟s Length Standard, and PBT represents the profit 
before tax. 
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We conducted our calculations based on the data 
available in the financial statements and additional 
financial reports of European multinational enterprises 
sourced from the Orbis database between April and June, 
2013 (covering the 2011 financial year). We focussed on 
corporations operating in the car manufacturing, the retail 
and the tour operator industries. Altogether 3,551 
companies headquartered in the EU member states 
belonging to 53 different corporate groups are involved in 
the analysis. 
EVIDENCEOF TAX AVOIDANCE 
IN EUROPE 
In order to prove the existence of the corporate income 
tax avoidance, we analysed the relationship between the 
income tax base of a given subsidiary (or group of 
subsidiaries) located in a member state and the 
production assets of the same subsidiary (or subsidiaries) 
registered in that same member state. Primarily, as proof 
of tax avoidance, we assumed that there is no stochastic 
relationship between these two, since multinational 
enterprises shift their profits to subsidiaries located in low 
tax countries, i.e. the location of the production and the 
location of the taxation of the profits originating from 
such activity diverge (OECD, 2013). Such profit shifting 
aims to erode the income tax base of the subsidiaries 
located in high tax countries, and the multinational 
enterprises often manipulate the prices of intra-company 
transactions to achieve that purpose. For other techniques 
aiming to avoid corporate income tax, see further OECD, 
2013, Section 4: “Key tax principles and opportunities for 
base erosion and profit shifting”. 
Within this context, we analysed the geographic 
location of certain crucial production assets of the 
multinational enterprises, namely the fixed assets and the 
workforce (including the payroll costs and the numberof 
employees). Information regarding the corporations‟ 
fixed assets and workforce are generally available in the 
published financial statements; therefore, to determine 
the volume of such production assets we followed the 
definition of the national accounting standards of the EU 
member states. We defined the volume of the 
subsidiaries‟ fixed assets based on the data provided in 
the unconsolidated balance sheet of financial year 2011. 
Regarding the workforce we took the average of the 
payroll cost and the number of employeesalso published 
in the unconsolidated financial statements of 2011.  
In order to test our hypothesis above, we applied a 
simple linear regression model where the income tax base 
distribution is regarded as the dependent variable and the 
distribution of the fixed assets is regarded as the 
explanatory variable. Based on Figure 1, it can be 
concluded that under the current income tax regime, the 
geographical distribution of the fixed assets does not 
determinethe tax base distribution (R2= 0.167; P=0.002). 
This shows that the location of the fixed assets of the 
multinational enterprise cannot explain the location of the 
profit taxation. 
Figure 1. Relationship between the distribution of the tax base and the fixed assets 
Source: authors’own elaboration 
Wecarried outthe same test regarding the 
distribution of the workforce as well (Figure 2) and found 
that there is no stochastic relationship between the 
distribution of the tax base and the location of the 
workforce (R2= 0.163; P=0.003). 
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Figure 2. Relationship between the distribution of the tax base and the workforce 
Source: author’s own elaboration 
POSSIBLE REMEDIES OF THE 
PROBLEM  
The alternative of the current international tax 
regime views the income of the multinational enterprise 
on a consolidated basis and disregards the analysis of the 
corporate structure. Such a model allocates the proper 
volume of the taxable income to a countrybased on an 
allocation formula (Musgrave, 1972; Musgrave, 1995) 
(this is the so-called formulary apportionment).   
Currently, both the OECD and the United Nations 
reject the international application of formulary 
apportionment; however, European tax harmonization 
efforts are aiming at the introduction of this alternative 
model within the European Union.The European 
Commission published arelated proposal in 2011: 
“Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, COM (2011) 121/4”, 
hereinafter: CCCTB proposal. Besides this there are 
numerous tax policy initiatives aiming for the samein 
other nations as well (Clausing & Avi-Yonah, 2008; 
Martens-Weiner, 2009). 
According to the CCCTB Proposal, the 
consolidated income tax base of a multinational 
enterprise shall be allocated to a given EU member state 
based on the following index (Article 86.1):  
ωm =
1
3
× (
1
2
×
payroll  cost m
 payroll  costni=1
+
1
2
×
employees m
 employeesni=1
) +
1
3
×
fixed  assets m
 fixed  assetsni=1
+
1
3
×
sales  revenue m
 sales  revenueni=1
 (2) 
Equation 2. Allocation formula of the CCCTB proposal 
The production assets included in the CCCTB 
Proposal are the fixed assets and the workforce (average 
of the payroll cost and the number of employees). In 
order to quantify the fixed assets factor, the European 
Commission reviewed the application of the historical 
cost, the fair market value, the net book value and the net 
tax value (the historical cost decreased by the tax 
depreciation cost) (European Commission, Directorate 
General Taxation and Customs Union, 2006) and the 
CCCTP Proposal recommends the application of the net 
tax value. The application of the net value versus the 
historical cost of the fixed assets is crucial, as the 
different timing of the investments could distort the 
allocation mechanism (the income tax base would be 
allocated to those member states where the multinational 
enterprise operates its newer investments) (Musgrave, 
1984). Further questions are related to the effect of 
inflation and foreign exchange rate fluctuations on the 
fixed assets factor. As far as the workforce is concerned, 
the allocation formula of the CCCTB Proposal includes 
the average of the payroll cost incurred during the 
financial year and the number of employeesat financial 
year end. Several analyses have concluded that the 
application of the payroll cost itself would distort the 
allocation mechanism due to the immense differences in 
the wage levels between the member states (for example, 
see McLure, 2002).  
Primarily, we were assuming that the model of 
formulary apportionment mentioned above is able to 
hinder the artificial profit shifting techniques, and 
therefore, is able to close a significant part of the 
loopholes for the corporate income tax avoidance. Similar 
to the analysis of the current income tax regime, we 
examined the relationship between the distribution of the 
tax base hypothetically allocated to a given EU member 
state in case the formulary apportionment model were 
introduced within a European context and the distribution 
(i.e. the location) of the fixed assets and the workforce.  
First we made the test regarding the distribution of 
the fixed assets (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. Relationship between the alternative distribution of tax base and the distribution of fixed assets 
Source: authors’own elaboration 
Based on the above, we concluded that in the case 
of the application of the formulary apportionment model 
the distribution of the income tax base is determined 
significantly more stronglyby the geographical location 
of the fixed assets than in the case of the current income 
tax model. Based on the significant and stochastic 
relationship (R2= 0.648; P=0.000), it can be stated that 
the application of the formulary apportionment model 
decreases the possibility of tax avoidance, since in this 
case the tax jurisdictions of the countries where the 
corporation‟s fixed assets are operatingattract the income 
tax base of the corporations. As the fixed assets are 
generally not immobile assets, the corporation‟s tax 
planning possibilities aiming attax avoidance are 
expected to decrease ifthe formulary apportionment is 
applied.  
In addition, we also tested the relationship between 
the income tax base allocation and the geographical 
distribution of the workforce in the case that the 
formulary apportionment model were introduced in a 
European context (Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Relationship between the alternative distribution of the tax base and the distribution of workforce 
Source: authors’ own elaboration 
In this case, there is also a significant and stochastic 
relationship between the distribution of the income tax 
base and the workforce (R2= 0.777; P=0.000). Similar to 
the analysis of the distribution of the fixed assets, this 
result leads to the conclusion that the application of the 
formulary apportionment model decreases the risk of tax 
avoidance. Similarly to the fixed assets, the workforce 
generally qualifies as an immobile asset.   
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Comparing the current international tax allocation 
model (represented by the tests shown in Figures 1 and 2) 
to the formulary apportionment model (represented by 
the tests in Figures 3 and 4), we could prove the existence 
of tax avoidance. Under the current international tax 
allocation model, the reported location of the income tax 
base and the production assets representing the real 
business operations diverge, confirming that the income 
tax base of the corporations isartificially shifted to 
member states where insignificant volumes of fixed 
assets and workforce are located. Based on the 
methodology of the formulary apportionment, the 
multinational enterprises would rely on the volume of the 
consolidated income tax base and due to the tax 
consolidation concept they would have to disregard the 
revenues and expenses of the intra-company transactions. 
Applying the formulary apportionment model of the 
CCCTB Proposal, multinational enterprises‟ profit would 
be taxed in those EU member states where their real and 
immobile business operations take place (measured by 
the location of fixed assets, workforce and sales). This 
mechanism would hinder the option of shifting profits 
artificially to low-tax member states by applying unfair 
transfer prices on intra-company transactions. The tests 
presented in Figures 3 and 4 prove that in the case of the 
application of the formulary apportionment the profit of 
the multinational enterprises would be taxed in those 
member states where the real business operations 
(measured by the location of fixed assets and workforce) 
are located. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER 
CONCERNS 
In short, it can be stated that the introduction of 
formulary apportionment under the umbrella of a 
European tax reform would have positive effect on the 
tax environment of the multinational corporations 
operating in the European economy. It is proved that the 
corporations would lose a significant part of their profit 
shifting and tax base erosion (i.e. tax avoidance) 
techniques, as when allocating their income tax base 
among different subsidiaries they would have to rely on 
factors which might not be mobilized easilyfor tax 
planning reasons only. 
On the other hand, one could argue whether the 
production factors included in the European proposal are 
really those which can substantially determine the 
location where the values are created by a given 
multinational enterprise. The relevance of the workforce 
factor in the income allocation methodology is definite; 
however, the expansion of digital economic models and 
the  increasing importance of intangibles in the intra-
group value chains suggest that the location of the fixed 
assets alonecannot represent the place of value 
production anymore. However, the involvement of the 
intangible assets in the formulary apportionment model 
may open the possibilities for different tax avoidance 
techniques again; Grubert (1998) and Dischinger & 
Riedel (2011) both proved the significance of intangible 
assets in the profit-shifting behaviour of the multinational 
enterprises. 
A further concern says that a major European (or 
international) income tax reform is a utopian scheme 
which will not be accepted by the countries consensually. 
In our view, the expanding harmonization of the 
sovereign tax environments will be forced by the 
increasing budgetary constraints of the governments and 
the conflicting public pressure about the tax morals of the 
multinational enterprises. The question is how sensitive 
the political and economic leadership of the European 
Union member states istothese claims.  
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